Since independence Ukraine has attracted very little foreign direct investment, both in absolute terms, and relative to other transition economies. This is the case when we analyse the ratio of FDI to GDP and exports, and the amount of FDI per capita. This paper examines the causes of the low level of FDI, and offers some policy prescriptions which may help to reverse this unfavourable trend. JEL Classification: F20, F21, F23, F32
Introduction
By direct investment we mean an investment in a foreign country where the investing party (corporation, firm) usually retains control over the investment, although it can include taking a minority stake. A direct investment typically takes the form of a foreign firm starting a subsidiary or taking control of an existing firm in a given country. Direct investments have increasing importance in the world economy.
Although not a direct pillar of economic reform in the transformation from central planning to market economies in the former Soviet bloc, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been viewed as an important component of the overall process of transition. 1 This is because FDI can bring many advantages to the host nation. These include:
• The scarcity of domestic investment funds in the transition countries have been partly offset by an inflow of foreign capital, and in particular by FDI
• The presence of a strategic foreign investor has positive side effects such as better corporate governance, managerial expertise and skills, actual or potential access to new markets and distribution networks
• It is obvious that in the short run the host country will under normal conditions improve its balance of payments and possibly also its terms of trade.
This paper is going to concentrate on the issue of FDI in relation to Ukraine. It would be both unrealistic and difficult to make a precise judgement as to what an adequate level of FDI for Ukraine would be given the enormity of the task of economic transition. Various sectors of the economy are making their own estimation as to how much is required. But these are purely subjective soundings rather than any concrete appraisal of investment. There is no doubt that significant levels of FDI would be encouraged by a stable political and economic environment. Unfortunately Ukraine's actual situation differs from this as will be demonstrated in this paper. The paper's first section will provide a general review of developments since independence i.e. the overall picture in Ukraine by looking at the role played by FDI in the economy, and its role in the overall strategy of reform. Section two will place FDI in Ukraine in a comparative light and examine the extent to which the argument or proposition that Ukraine has been unable to attract significant levels of FDI is a true or fair assessment.
The final section will investigate the various impediments such as legal institutional, and political, which have up till now discouraged further foreign investments, and the outlook for the future, in particular what conditions or criteria need to be met in order to boost FDI in Ukraine in the coming years.
Review of Developments Since Independence and the Role of FDI in the Ukrainian Transition Process

The necessity and role of FDI in the Ukrainian transition process
At the beginning of transition it was recognised that a sustained inflow of private foreign capital would be essential in order to modernise and restructure Ukrainian industry. What was required was not only foreign capital but also technology, management skills, and know how which is precisely what FDI would bring.
It was envisaged that in addition to the benefits mentioned in the introduction, the role of FDI would be the following: FDI is attractive as a non-debt creating source of current account finance, and more broadly as an indicator of growing international confidence in the sustainability of the entire process of reform. A steady flow of FDI is an important sign of confidence since the world's major credit rating agencies include it among their indicators of international creditworthiness; the operation of foreign firms within the host economy would contribute to the development of management skills essential for efficient enterprise behaviour in the market economy, and can also help to build a new business ethic; FDI could also contribute to the process of privatisation financially. A great deal of private savings in Ukraine have been eroded by inflation, and would in any event have been inadequate given the enormity of the privatisation task. Foreign financing can help to breach the savings gap.
Legislative basis for FDI in Ukraine 2
In recognising the positive impact that FDI could make on the Ukrainian economy various laws have been passed since 1991 to facilitate its role. The first law was passed on March 12, 1992 offering at least on the surface a highly favourable investment regime. This was the law on foreign investment which included protection against future nationalisation, participation in the privatisation programme, five year tax holidays, and the promise of profit repatriation in hard currency (after the deduction of a 15% withholding tax). In May 1993 this law was replaced by the decree on the foreign investment regime deemed by many as more hard-line towards foreign investors since it increased the amount of investment required to qualify for tax concessions (from as little as $16 to $10,000). Nevertheless the decree continued to guarantee that all foreign investors, after payment of taxes, can freely and immediately transfer abroad the income profits and other foreign currency assets that were obtained in connection with their investments.
On February 11, 1994 , the government published the "Government Programme for
Encouraging Foreign Investment in Ukraine" which officially came into effect on March 1, 1994 . The Programme's most notable objectives included among others: To secure foreign financing for various industrial sectors; to increase technological knowhow and the quality of production; and to limit energy and raw material waste.
The most recent major legislation in this area is the law on Foreign investment status passed on March 20, 1996. According to this, enterprises with foreign capital, which participate in state programmes will be granted tax privileges for the first three years of their activity. One such programme has included the state programme for energy sector development e.g. oil exploration in Crimea. Foreign investments cannot be nationalised or requisitioned.
Currently the legal framework in Ukraine can be characterised in the following terms as far as FDI is concerned:
• There are certain rights guaranteed to foreign investors which include: participation in the management of companies with foreign capital; share of profits in proportion to investment; share in the value of the assets of the company after termination and repatriation; the laws in force at the time when the investment agreement was signed are applicable; less favourable new regulations may not be later imposed on foreign investors.
• All industries are open to foreign investors except strategic ones e.g. defence and sectors involved in the mining of precious materials like gold and platinum.
• There are three ways of investing in Ukraine: (1) Through joint ventures with a local partner or wholly foreign owned entity. (2) By adding to the capital of the existing local company and/ or by acquiring a share of an existing local company.
(3) By setting up a new wholly foreign owned company.
• All foreign investors have to go through the process of registration with the ministry of finance which registers between 3-21 days, the contract in conformity with Ukrainian legislation. After registration the foreign investor has the legal authority to conduct business
• With a 30% profit tax rate Ukraine has one of the highest tax burdens. Other taxes which apply to business include VAT, and social pensions funds to which employers have to make a contribution
• Laws guarantee the free transfer of profit. Foreign subsidiaries are entitled to free and unrestricted transfer of their profits abroad in foreign currency.
• Investment is classified as foreign investment if it is not less than 20% of an enterprise's charter capital and is no less than US$50,000 ($10,000 for banks and other financial institutions) provided that the investment is in the form of movable or immovable property. If the investment is in the form of convertible currency the minimum required is increased to US$ 500,000 or US$1million for banks and financial institutions.
Despite the various rights assigned to foreign investors, and aimed at facilitating foreign investment, in practice foreign investors have had to endure various difficulties, not all legal, which we will analyse in section three. Some of these are related to the legislation already discussed, some to other legislation which has offset or contradicted the beneficial aspects of the original legislation.
Review of inflows of FDI in Ukraine since independence
At the outset Ukraine was seen as a potentially attractive country for making foreign investments for the following reasons: considerable potential in the market for selling commodities and services; availability of a highly skilled labour force with relatively low wage levels; diverse raw material potential; and a favourable geographical potential.
However, in reality Ukraine has had great difficulty in gaining access to markets. to assess how much is required. Therefore, despite the recent progress in attracting FDI, Ukraine has a long way to go before it will be able to meet this target, even if it were to be regarded as a sound estimate, and in any case there is no guarantee that the estimated figure will not have been revised upward as transition continues. 1996 the level of FDI as a percentage of exports increased to 3.1%, the highest figure since independence, and a reflection largely of the increased level of FDI attracted by Ukraine in 1996. FDI inflows per capita (see table 2) which was around 4 dollars at the start of independence rose in 1996 to represent 6 dollars per head. It has to be stressed that this is very small amount for such a big country.
A noticeable feature of FDI in Ukraine has been its uneven regional distribution. The bulk of it has gone to the most economically advanced regions. Table 3 shows that Kiev, Odessa, Donetsk have benefited from the lion's share of FDI. The less attractive regions include Rivenska, Vinnitska, and Volynska, and they have gained much less FDI. course has a detrimental effect on the regions that lose out as their economic development is hampered. In order to avoid serious regional disparities it is important that much needed large scale investment, some of which is likely to come from foreign sources, is evenly distributed. This of course would be difficult to achieve in practice unless potential investors are offered considerable financial incentives to set up in less attractive regions.
The main sources of FDI have been Western Europe, Russia and the US. As of July 1996 the US led the way with about 19% of all FDI in Ukraine since independence followed closely by Germany with around 16.1%. Other significant contributions include 7.9% from Russia and 6.8% from Great Britain. Together these four nations accounted for about 50% of the total level of FDI in Ukraine. Other unlikely sources have included Cyprus (this is due to Cypriot laws on company registration) and Switzerland .
Not all the principal donor nations invest in the same sectors. There is a degree of diversity involved. The following is a breakdown of the sectors in which the major donors invested: America's sectoral distribution of investment saw 19.5% going to financial credit and insurance services, 17.2% to internal trade, and 13% to machinebuilding. German investment saw 27.8% go to internal trade, 20.2% to machine building/metal works, and 19.4% to food processing. In contrast British investment was concentrated in the industrial sector which received 67.6% of all investment by Britain. While Russia invested 44.2% in the public health sector and 19.3% in insurance.
The overall sectoral distribution of FDI in Ukraine illustrates that the bulk of it has gone into the trade sector (both domestic and foreign) followed but some way behind by the food processing sector. Table 4 highlights the sectoral share of FDI at the end of 1995. At the beginning of transition the areas that were selected for priority investment 6 included food processing, metallurgy, light industry, and transport. Table 4 shows that to a large degree most of the designated priority areas have received FDI. is a long way to go before such projections -assuming that they are correct -are met.
It has to be pointed out that most investment in Ukraine will have to be funded from domestic sources even if the climate for FDI improves.
Investors can invest in a variety of ways. 7 They may invest directly in the enterprises of different industries by setting up joint ventures on the basis of agreements (contracts) on productive co-operation. They may also participate in the privatisation of state owned assets but as we will see in section three they face problems in this highly bureaucratic and complex process. Some of the foreign direct investors in Ukraine 
Comparative Cumulative Inflows of FDI
In this section we will look at the cumulative level of FDI in Ukraine in order to analyse in comparison to other transition economies its ability to prove since transition a favourable target for foreign investors. (table 5) , Ukraine comes fourth. Although this appears on the face a commendable position out of fifteen, especially considering that two of the three above it Russia and Kazakhstan are large republics in terms of area, it is less so if one considers that Ukraine lags considerably behind Russia and Kazakhstan. Russia has attracted some 5 times more FDI than Ukraine while Kazakhstan has attracted some 3 times more. So Ukraine lags well behind these two, a poor performance given its large population (second largest former republic in population terms), and its large profile (at the time of independence it was among the club of very large nuclear states).
If we compare Ukraine's FDI performance with the non-FSU the story is even more negative. In the list of non-FSU countries shown in table 6 Ukraine comes second last, a poor performance considering that it is larger in size and more populated than each of the selected countries. Hungary for example has attracted a staggering 20 times more, and the Czech Republic 9 times more, and Poland 4 times more. Although in fairness both Poland and Hungary were well advanced in their level of economic reforms and development well before Ukraine gained Independence, and well before Ukraine embarked upon economic transition. Yet the same cannot be said of Romania or the Slovak Republic, nor of Estonia and Kazakhstan in Ukraine's defence.
So why then is Ukraine lagging behind Russia and Kazakhstan, Estonia, and virtually all of the non-FSU in attracting FDI? We will analyse this question in some detail in the final section but it may be worth noting at this point that the countries which have attracted the most FDI are also those which have been ranked in the category of advanced reformers. Table 7 shows that Ukraine has had the third lowest cumulative inflows of FDI per capita in all of the former Soviet Union, registering $11 per head or per person, even behind some of the smallest (Moldova) and less developed or less advanced republics.
Comparative Cumulative Inflows of FDI per capita
When compared with the non-FSU it actually comes bottom of the table behind by staggering amounts if we compare with Hungary which had 1113 per capita and the Czech Republic with 532 per capita. If we look at FDI inflows as a percentage of the total gross domestic product in 1995   (see table 8 ), Ukraine's FDI inflows constituted only 0.4% of its GDP. This was equal to Russia's but was lower than every other former Soviet republic, and the rest of Eastern Europe. Hungary once again led the way with FDI inflows constituting 10.2% of GDP. Table 9 shows that Ukraine's inflows of FDI as a proportion of its total exports in 1995 barely amounted to 1%. In comparison other former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Latvia were well ahead. As a proportion of its exports, Hungary's inflows of FDI constituted a staggering 35% of its exports. This is hardly surprising given that in 1995, and in the previous year, Hungary was the largest single recipient of FDI in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Comparative Inflows of FDI as a ratio of GDP
Comparative Inflows of FDI as a ratio of exports
The basic point that can be derived from the analysis in this section is that in relation to population, GDP or any other indicator, Ukraine has so far attracted very little FDI at all.
Current obstacles and future prospects
The previous two sections have shown that Ukraine has attracted significantly less FDI both in absolute and relative terms to most of the other transition economies. This section will examine why Ukraine's performance has been so disappointing, and what it can do to boost future prospects. The analysis in this section will also allow us to isolate the prevailing environment and what impact it has on attracting FDI. The problems which foreign investors have had to confront can be divided into legal, institutional, economic, and political.
Legal and Administrative barriers
One of the most critical problems which foreign investors confront are the legal impediments. 10 
Economic barriers related to reforms and transition: privatisation and competition policy
In Ukraine the privatisation process has on the whole been vague and complex, and has tended to exclude foreigners. 12 Privatisation in general has been slow to get underway in Ukraine. A slow and low rate of privatisation has limited the number of enterprises or potential partners for foreign investors. On a large part there has been a determination to keep the country's assets in Ukrainian hands. This has led to preference for worker buy-outs as the vehicle to private ownership. Related to this has been the fact that foreign investors have not always had equal access to the auctions which have formed part of the privatisation process. They face workers priority rights to stocks. Many Ukrainian officials still hold traditional, communist views about ownership, some even fearing a foreign take over. 13 They even viewed privatisation as a conspiracy by foreigners to take-over Ukrainian firms. Many who do not understand the privatisation process believe that it had been set up for the benefit of foreign capitalists who were going to take-over Ukraine.
Some associated problems with privatisation include the fact that most Ukrainian enterprises are unprofitable. This is hardly surprising given the lack of demand. They need large direct investment in the production sector. When privatising a state enterprise, the question of whether the investor must also solve its social problems depends on the specific nature of the agreement between the investor and the state.
Generally speaking, all social spheres of the enterprise are under the control of local authorities. It is clear that the substantial increase in costs to privatise state enterprises made privatisation unattractive for investors which is why foreign investment began to flow into Ukraine through other means e.g. through the creation of foreign and joint ventures.
If we look at competition policy 14 we find that the environment in this area has not exactly been conducive to attracting foreign investment. Despite the fact that a characterised by large plants and production. In other words he was indicating that they were largely natural monopolies which existed. However, this does not appear to be a very convincing answer. He went further and pointed out that no enterprise in Ukraine today had control of more than 50% of the market.
Perceptions of economic reform
Another major barrier to FDI in Ukraine is the general perception of economic reform.
In a World Bank survey Ukraine was ranked in the category of weak reformers, 16 and its general economic performance has been poor even though signs of improvement and recovery have been noted in the past year particularly with regard to inflation and GDP. But Ukraine's commitment to economic reform is seen as erratic, and economic stability has still not been achieved.
In other words a wholesale commitment to economic reform, and credible market policies do not exist on a scale that would attract or encourage greater foreign investment. Many foreign investors have preferred to adopt a wait and see attitude.
The country is still perceived as a high risk country to do business with. The country is dogged by a crisis mentality which hinders the ability of the Ukrainian economy to attract foreign investment while demand is rising. The net result is an unfavourable business environment in Ukraine.
Lack of incentives
Income tax which is high acts as a disincentive. This refers to both personal and 
Crime
Since the break up of the Soviet Union there has been a proliferation of crime not just common crime (murder, burglary, rape) but also economic crime. 17 This type of crime has included bribery, extortion, black market activities. It is also well documented that there has been the development of a shadow or unofficial economy not only in Ukraine but in fact in all transition economies.
However, the problem in Ukraine in this respect has been extremely severe. According to Western sources Ukraine has one of the largest unofficial economies in Central and
Eastern Europe estimated to be in the region of 20-30% of GDP. However according to Ukrainian officials and academics the West may be underestimating the size of the shadow economy and they claim that a more realistic figure is a staggering 50-55% of GDP. Why has there been an increased wave of crime? The disappearance of many former central control systems (such as Gosplan), the creation of novel property arrangements (such as privatisation) and the now virtually unlimited and unregulated access to retail markets have greatly expanded the opportunities for economic crime.
Specific types of economic crime have included: exploiting opportunities to collect illegal rents, and to convert public property into private profit. Recent cases have also seen Western businessmen the target of assassinations by organised criminal groups.
While there does exist legislation, criminal laws particularly those relating to the protection of property and the prohibition of money laundering and corrupt practices are viewed as insufficiently developed and insufficiently policed. Crime has become a problem for Ukraine because it inhibits foreign confidence in the economy and therefore represents a cost to the Ukrainian economy. Furthermore, it diverts financial and labour resources away from some of the more important tasks associated with transition, and can act as an unnecessary distraction to the government in its pursuit of economic reform.
Infrastructure
Poor development of infrastructure particularly the quality of roads. Although the road network is large -a total of 273,700km of highway -and roads are regarded as sound enough -it is their maintenance which is a major concern, caused by bad workmanship and low quality materials used in construction. In addition the telephone system is inadequate both for business and for personal use: about 8 million telephone circuits serve about 52 million people. Telephone density is 151.4 telephone circuits per 1000 persons.
Future outlook
So what can Ukraine do in order to reverse its so far dismal record on FDI? The policy solution or answer is short: It will have to eliminate most if not all of the barriers mentioned in section three. But unfortunately execution of this policy solution is likely to be a long process, and is easier said than done. This section will state briefly some policy prescriptions not dwelling too long on each area as some of the problems related with each solution have already been looked at in previous sections. 
Conclusions
In Ukraine a combination of political, ideological, institutional, and legislative obstacles have failed to generate the necessary or desired level of FDI, although the performance in the last year or so has improved since 1995. In 1993 Ukraine's stock of FDI was $0.21bn dollars. In 1994 it was $0.37bn dollars. In 1995 it had increased to $0.56bn dollars. A more stable political process and climate where the various political institutions such as the executive and legislative are able to work in harmony or in tandem, and are able to resolve their differences amicably, a strong commitment to economic reform even in the face of tough public opposition and outcry will be essential, and would generate a more credible environment for attracting FDI. 19 What is needed is a leadership which is able to ride the storm generated by tough and at times painful shock therapy treatment or economic policies in the interests of Ukraine's long term development. The country certainly has the potential to be an economic power but only once it can successfully negotiate the first and perhaps most difficult phase of economic transition.
